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their foreign debt and yet continue to expend the vast sums which they are now expending for armament, it would cause us to adopt an entirely different policy in case there should be a failure to agree upon disarmament. For one, if there should be a reluctance upon their part to enter upon any reasonable agreement with reference to disarmament, I should certainly consider that the American people would feel justified in insisting that they promptly arrange their debt and promptly meet the interest upon their debt.

France at the present time has about 800,000 men in her army. She is the most thoroughly militaristic nation in Europe, if not in the world. Her expenditures for her military equipment are the greatest of any power in the world. I recognize, of course, in the relationship between Germany and France a situation which would justify a reasonable preparedness on her part; but an army of 800,000 men under the conditions in which Germany finds herself at the present time is very difficult to justify.

The British navy will cost this year about \$765,586,080 and the British army very much more. I have seen it stated as high as \$1,968,300,000—that is, her army in Ireland, in India, in China, in Mesopotamia, and so forth. I read a statement made by a member of Parliament that England is expending in her attempt to control Mesopotamia \$40,000,000 per month.

Now, what is the effect of this under the present program? The effect of it is that the taxpayer of the United States is not only bearing the burdens with reference to our own armaments, but the American taxpayer is, in fact, carrying the burden of the armaments of France and England and Italy. Let it not be forgotten or misunderstood that under this policy we are not only financing our armaments program, but we are financing the armaments program of Europe, or a large part of Europe.

If I have a farm and finance it, stock it, and furnish the means to run it, and also furnish to my neighbor the means to stock his farm and run it, and collect neither principal nor interest, I am carrying both farms, am I not? So long as this debt remains unpaid and the interest remains unpaid, and the American taxpayer must meet the taxes which are imposed upon him because of the deferment of interest and the payment of the principal, we are taking care of the entire armaments of the United States and our late allies. I say, therefore, that it would be short-sighted policy, indeed, for the United States to place itself in a position where it might not modify its policy with reference to the payment of the debt or the interest according to the result of the disarmament conference. To my mind, that is the most important feature at the present time connected with this question of the payment of the foreign debt.

Understand me, of course, in speaking of this matter, and urging as I do the taking care of this debt, I recognize that those countries have their obligations and their difficulties and adversities now the same as we have; but I insist that there should be the best evidence of the best of faith upon the part of these governments in meeting their debt, and that the United States should insist upon that policy without equivocation or apology.

I am therefore not in favor of any decisive movement with reference to this debt at the present time. It is there. The evidence of it is there. It is a legal obligation. It is just as binding as if it were in a bond. It is subject to call. We may ask for it now, the same as we could if we had a bond and it was due. There is no possible loss. We may utilize it. We may utilize the interest. There is only one thing involved, and that is the question of policy. There is no necessity for funding it for the purpose of putting it in better legal condition. So far no statement has been made as to any financial advantage. So far nothing has been said that would disclose an advantage to the American taxpayer, while upon the other hand if the debt is left subject to call, it is ours to utilize as emergencies arise and conditions suggest. It will play an important part at the Washington conference, whether it is ever mentioned or not. It will be there, coloring and shaping and directing all the proceedings, molding and shaping the councils in their final conclusions; and it will be vastly to the advantage of the United States if it remains just as it is now until we shall have de-

termined whether the world can get rid of its armaments or whether we are to go forward over the road which we are now traveling and which leads inevitably to bankruptcy or war, and possibly both.

So vital and so commanding is the question of disarmament I would utilize all the power that this great Republic can command to change the program relative to armaments which is now being carried forward; and if I could use this vast debt, if the obligations which it imposes could be commanded to that end, I would not hesitate to do it. I would be considerate, I would be courteous, to all nations, but I would be brutal in the exertion of all power at my command before I would see humanity further tortured and civilization destroyed by keeping up this barbarous system of crushing armaments.

## THE REFERENDUM ON WAR

Senator E. F. Ladd, who has just entered the upper branch of Congress from North Dakota, that State which so often has shown indifference to hoary precedent, offered a few days ago a resolution against this country going to war until there shall have been a referendum, except in case of insurrection or invasion.

The resolution went to the Committee on the Judiciary, from which it is likely to have difficulty in emerging in a form satisfactory to Senator Ladd. Even among some of the most determined advocates of peaceful settlements of international disputes, there remains doubt of the wisdom of taking the decision as to the making of war away from the representatives of the people and placing it in the hands of the people themselves. And the Ladd resolution may lack fervent support from certain of those in favor of what Senator Ladd wants; they may hold it to be ineffective, since it seeks merely to express "the sense of the Senate" that a referendum should be taken, and that may be regarded as not controlling any future Senate.

However, it is quite possible that the Ladd resolution may evoke considerable support from elements in the Middle West and the Northwest which are in favor of the general idea, resulting in popular agitation, which is what its proponents want at this time. Senator Ladd himself evidently intends to do all in his power to make his resolution the basis for discussion of the theory that, barring sudden rebellions or invasions, declaration of war is not justifiable until the people who must pay have been given opportunity to record their opinions. Immediately upon introducing his resolution he made this argument to the people:

On December 12, 1916, nearly two years and a half after the World War had begun and but four short months before we entered it, President Wilson declared in a note to the belligerent powers that he didn't know what the war was about nor did any one else, even the belligerents themselves, as he stated in a note to them:

"The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of the unprecedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in truth to stand outside its influence or be safe against its disturbing effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have never been definitely stated."

"The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guarantees, what political or territorial

changes or readjustments, what stage of military success ever would bring the war to an end."

In an address at St. Louis, September 5, 1919, he said:

"Why, my fellow-citizens, is there any man here or any woman, let me say is there any child here, who does not know that the seed of war in the modern world is industrial and commercial rivalry? The real reason that the war that we have just finished took place was that Germany was afraid her commercial rivals were going to get the better of her, and the reason why some nations went into the war against Germany was that they thought Germany would get the commercial advantage of them. The seed of jealousy, the seed of the deep-seated hatred was hot, successful commercial and industrial rivalry."

On the preceding day, September 4, 1919, at Indianapolis, Ind., President Wilson said:

"If there had been nine days of discussion Germany would not have gone to war. If there had been nine days upon which to bring to bear the opinion of the world, the judgment of mankind upon the purposes of those governments, they never would have dared to execute those purposes."

The primary purpose and ultimate object of this resolution is to ascertain the opinion of the American people on the subject of engaging in a war with a foreign government except to repel invasion or attack. As the power to declare war is vested in the Congress of the United States by the Federal Constitution, it is natural and it is necessary that the Congress should be accurately informed as to how the people feel about a matter of such transcendent importance to them.

A moment's reflection will show that this only is the practicable and effective way to determine a question of such momentous seriousness, involving as it does such tragic and far-reaching consequences.

Most of the wars that have drenched the world with the blood of the most precious lives, destroyed the results of years of arduous labor, and turned back the hands on the dial of human progress would never have occurred if the peoples who were engaged in them had been consulted.

By submitting the question to the people, crooked, surreptitious diplomacy would receive its death blow. Every phase of the proposition would be discussed. Every important fact brought forth. Every reason, wise or otherwise, would naturally be advanced. The spectacle of a few irresponsible and unscrupulous diplomats conspiring behind closed doors to make pawns of peaceable people in order to gratify their commercial, material, and political ambitions would not be possible. There would be no place for clandestine intriguing, secret treaties, confidential understandings, spheres of influence, and other abominable negotiations that these may suggest and which have invariably characterized the procedures of secret diplomacy.

As this is, as the immortal Lincoln declared, "a government of the people, by the people, and for the people," it follows as a necessary corollary that upon a question of such vital significance the people ought to be, and it is their natural God-given right to be, consulted.

It would be difficult, if not impossible, for any true American to offer any rational opposition to this proposition. It is the people who must produce the soldiers, that sacrifice their lives, bear the burden of taxation, undergo all the privations, endure all the suffering and make all the sacrifices—then why in the name of justice should they not have an opportunity to be heard in the matter?

The text of Senator Ladd's resolution follows:

#### Resolution

Whereas there is no question touching the life and welfare of the people of the United States of such importance as the making of peaceful relations with other governments; and

Whereas the right of the people to a voice in the settlement of all questions of even less importance is asserted in the Declaration of Independence and guaranteed by the Constitution: Therefore be it

*Resolved*, That it is the sense of the Senate that no declaration of war by Congress and no act of war by the Executive branch of the Government of the United States shall be

taken except to suppress insurrection or repel invasion, as provided for by the Constitution of the United States, until the question at issue shall be submitted to a referendum of the voters of the United States.

## THE HIGH COST OF KILLING

Below is a comparison of the cost of the government in the fiscal year 1916, the last before the war, and the current fiscal year, 1922, which shows something of the price paid in dollars for warfare. It will be seen, by examination of the table, that the present price of past wars, including the World War, has increased 806 per cent over 1916, while the present cost of being ready for further wars makes the army cost 214 per cent more and the navy 156 per cent.

That is not the worst of it. The totals given do not take into account any of the deficiency bills that will be passed this year, except the emergency appropriation contained in the second deficiency act for the 1921 fiscal year, which ended June 30. Exactly what the war costs will be for the year, by the time everything is paid, cannot be forecast.

But Secretary Mellon has stated to the Ways and Means Committee that he expects the army to spend in the 1922 fiscal year \$450,000,000, which is nearly \$100,000,000 more than is shown in the table of appropriations given below; and he stated that the navy was expected to spend \$487,225,000, or about \$60,000,000 more than is shown below. All of that is apart from the expected expenditure of three-quarters of a billion of dollars in this year for railroads and shipping, due almost wholly to the war.

	<i>Comparative Statement of Appropriations for 1916 and 1922</i>		Increase of 1922 over 1916. Per cent.
	1916. Amount.	1922. Amount.	
1. Appropriations incident to past wars, including services to veterans and the public-debt service	\$186,687,760	\$1,691,406,485	806
2. Appropriations for the army.....	113,239,060	356,121,809	214
3. Appropriations for the navy.....	166,845,060	426,922,645	156
I. Total for past wars and army and navy.....	466,721,870	2,474,450,939	430
4. Appropriations for civil purposes	253,543,083	486,506,994	92
II. Total for all purposes except the postal service..	720,264,953	2,960,957,983	311
5. Appropriations for postal service..	306,228,453	574,092,552	87
III. Grand total.....	\$1,026,443,406	\$2,535,050,485	244